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Abstract
In the summer of 2014 Russia imposed a ban on most agri-food products from
countries enforcing Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia. We use a speciﬁc
factors computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the short-run
impact of this retaliatory policy. The baseline is carefully designed to isolate the
impacts of the ban on the European Union (EU), Russia itself and a selection of
key trade partners. The modelling of the ban follows a novel approach, where it is
treated as a loss of established trade preferences via reductions in consumer utility
in the Armington import function. Not surprisingly, the results indicate that Russia
bears the highest income loss (about €3.4 billion) while the EU recovers part of its
lost trade through expansion of exports to other markets. An ex-post comparison
between simulation results and observed trade data reveals the model predictions to
be broadly accurate, thereby validating the robustness of the modelling approach.
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1. Introduction
In the legal vernacular of international trade relations, quantitative restrictions are
subsumed within GATT article XI as proscribed by the World Trade Organisation
(WTO).2 Nevertheless, exceptions to this article are recognised by the WTO on eco-
nomic grounds (safeguarding mechanism, developing countries exemption) and non-
economic grounds (protection of human, animal or plant life/health, security interest).
Presumably under the auspices of the latter, to ‘protect national security of the Russian
Federation’,3 on 7 August 2014, Russia imposed a 1-year import ban on a list of agri-
food products from the European Union (EU), the United States of America (USA),
Norway, Canada and Australia. This list covers almost all meat products (beef, pig-
meat, poultry and certain sausages), milk and dairy products, fruits and vegetables, as
well as ﬁsh and crustaceans. This trade ban was introduced in addition to existing
Russian trade restrictions on North American cattle meat from February 2013 (no
guarantee of ractopamine-free exports), European pig meat from February 2014
(African swine fever) and Polish fruit and vegetables from August 2014 (pest, and resi-
dues of pesticides and nitrates).4 On 25 July 2015, Russia announced a 1 year prolon-
gation of the ban on agri-food products (until August 2016), which has been extended
to Iceland, Liechtenstein, Albania and Montenegro.5
Of all the targeted countries, the EU as a group was potentially the most aﬀected.
With the exceptions of poultry (USA) and ﬁsh and crustaceans (Norway), EU exports
in the remaining banned product categories accounted for the largest Russian import
trade share prior to the ban (FAO, 2014). Furthermore, at the time this measure was
enforced, Russia constituted the second most important destination for EU agri-food
exports, accounting for approximately 10% (DG AGRI, 2014). Though 43% of EU
agri-food exports to Russia were hit by the ban (i.e. 4.2% of total EU agri-food
exports), further decomposition revealed that speciﬁc EU sectors and Member States
would be more heavily aﬀected.6
In response, the European Commission introduced emergency measures, especially
for fruits and vegetable (perishable) products through market withdrawals (free distri-
bution) and compensation for non-harvesting and green harvesting; for milk and dairy
products through private storage aid in addition to public intervention for butter and
skimmed-milk powder. Exceptional aid to milk producers in Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia and Finland was approved. Lastly additional funds were granted to promotion
2Note this paper does not address import restrictions such as quotas (e.g. tariﬀ rate quotas, sea-
sonal quotas, etc.) which remain frequently used in international trade relations.
3Presidential Decree No. 560 of 6 August 2014 ‘on the application of certain special economic
measures in order to protect national security of the Russian Federation’, and Government
Decree No. 778 of 7 August 2014 (amended by Government Decree No. 830 of 20 August
2014).
4The EU ﬁled a complaint at the WTO against Russia (member since August 2012) for the mea-
sures on imports of live pigs, pork and other pig products from the EU (Dispute DS4750).
5Presidential Decree No. 320 of 24 June 2015 320 ‘on the extension of certain special economic
measures in order to protect the national security of the Russian Federation’, and Government
Decree No. 625 of 25 June 2015.
6For a comprehensive picture of relative exposure to the Russian market of countries aﬀected
by the ban, based on existing trade ﬂows before the trade prohibition, see DG AGRI (2014),
FAO (2014) and European Parliament (2014).
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schemes for both EU and foreign markets. With no budgetary impacts, bilateral trade
negotiations were intensiﬁed in order to facilitate exports to other markets.
Examining the mechanics of a trade ban, the ensuing economic shock gives rise to
changes in resource allocation between economic activities. Furthermore, Czaga
(2004) notes that an import prohibition worsens the terms of trade for exporting
countries,7 and impacts on both consumers and downstream industries within the
country imposing the ban. As a recognised economy-wide market modelling tool,
there are several computable general equilibrium (CGE) quantitative assessments of
import bans in the agricultural economics literature. These include the ban on Geneti-
cally Modiﬁed Organisms (GMOs) imports (Anderson and Jackson, 2005; Philippidis,
2010; Henseler et al., 2013); the avian inﬂuenza outbreak (Rodriguez et al., 2007) and
the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak (McDonald and Roberts,
1998; Philippidis and Hubbard, 2001; Chatterjee et al., 2010), whilst a more recent
study directly examines the Russian ban (Antimiani et al., 2014). Here, we examine
the economic consequences of the Russian ban introduced in August 2014 for both
Russia and exporting countries, with a particular focus on the EU exporting coun-
tries. We focus attention on the short run, with factor mobility between sectors
restricted, in contrast to Antimiani et al. (2014).
We use a multi-region CGE methodology, although we characterise the ban
employing a diﬀerent and more intuitive approach (Philippidis, 2010). Moreover, to
accommodate the short-run nature of the ban, a speciﬁc factors approach that better
accommodates the short-run nature of the ban is proposed that restricts the mobility
of a share of the production factors within the economy. It should be made clear that
the modelling strategy focuses on the consequences of the Russian ban per se, and
does not take into account any policy responses to the ban by the EU, Russia or any
aﬀected country.8
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology which
includes the modelling approach, database preparation and scenarios. A carefully
designed baseline is used to account for the speciﬁc macroeconomic and agri-food
trade situation at the time the ban entered into force. In addition, precise import
shocks are implemented using detailed tariﬀ line trade data. Results are discussed in
section 3. A comparison between simulation results and observed data is presented in
section 4 to test the robustness of the model ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodology
2.1. Modelling approach
Multi-region neoclassical CGE models have become the de facto tool of choice for
assessing the implications of a trade shock and the resulting feedbacks on resource
7It is worth mentioning that the ban applied by Russia is partial since it aﬀects selected trade
partners. A total import ban would lead to trade volume of zero, thus inhibiting terms of trade
as there would be no substitute imports.
8Wegren (2014) discusses increasing public support from Russian authorities to develop domes-
tic agricultural and food industries, including ﬁnancial assistance of 87 billion roubles (approxi-
mately €1.2 billion) for Russian agricultural producers to cope with the eﬀects of the ban, and
239 billion roubles (approximately €3.3 billion) transferred to banks in late 2014, for ensuring
capital reserves and lending for Russian food producers.
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reallocation between competing activities, output, prices and trade ﬂows. This study
employs the well-known GTAP model (Hertel, 1997). As a demand driven model,
GTAP is based on standard neoclassical assumptions of constrained optimisation to
derive intermediate-input, factor and ﬁnal demand functions. Market clearing equa-
tions determine equilibrium prices, whilst a series of accounting conventions ensure
that the circular ﬂow of income, expenditure and output are equal. As is typical in
such models, imports are treated using a parsimonious CES Armington speciﬁcation,
which encompasses an exogenous treatment of region of origin (substitution elasticity)
allowing for two way gross bilateral trade ﬂows. Assuming that all domestic markets
clear, neoclassical model closure ensures that withdrawals (savings and imports) equal
injections (investment and exports) resulting in a net balance of payments of zero.
The modelling of the ban departs from the traditional ‘closure swap approach’,
where an (endogenous) tariﬀ reaches prohibitively high levels to target exogenous
reductions in imports (Anderson and Jackson, 2005; Henseler et al., 2013; Antimiani
et al., 2014). The underlying hypothesis is that tariﬀ driven import price increases
cause the fall in imports – which is not an accurate depiction of the Russian ban.
Instead, this study depicts Russia’s self-imposed ban and subsequent loss of access to
preferred import trade routes, as a reduction in import demand by Russian consumers
(Philippidis, 2010).9 More speciﬁcally, in log linear terms, equation (1) represents cost
minimising bilateral (Armington) import demands for ‘i’, from export region ‘r’ to
import region ‘s’ (qi,r,s), as a function of aggregate utility in region ‘s’ (ui,s), the bilat-
eral import price (pi,r,s), the composite price per unit of utility (pi,s), the elasticity of
substitution (ri) and bilateral consumer utility (zi,r,s):
qi;r;s ¼ ui;s  ri½pi;r;s  pi;s þ rizi;r;s ð1Þ
The composite price (equation (2)) is a trade weighted share (Si,r,s) of bilateral import
prices and utility, as well as the elasticity parameter, qi:
pi;s ¼
X
r
Si;r;s pi;r;s þ 1qi
 
zi;r;s
 
ð2Þ
Targeted (exogenous) reductions in Russian imports (i.e. ‘s’ = Russia) associated with
the ban, are enforced by associated (endogenous) falls in Russian bilateral import
demand, which also implies that the per unit cost of utility on banned good ‘i’, rises.
2.2. Database
The study employs version 9 of the GTAP database (Narayanan et al., 2015). Bench-
marked to the year 2011, it includes gross bilateral trade ﬂows, trade protection and
transport margins between 140 regions. The trade data are reconciled with input-out-
put data disaggregated to 57 tradeable sectors, supplemented by macro accounts data.
As the most recent dataset of its type, it includes features like Ukrainian accession to
the WTO. As a point of departure, further data updates are still required to correctly
isolate the impacts of the ban (see discussion below).
9In Philippidis (2010), falling utility was associated with reduced conﬁdence in the quality of the
imported product. In this paper, falls in consumer utility are rationalised by the fact that Rus-
sian consumers are being denied access to their preferred bundle of imported goods.
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The choice of 37 regions (Table 1) is based on those countries most aﬀected by the
ban (i.e. EU, Canada, USA, Norway and Australia) and Russia’s key trade partners
across the selection of banned products. Remaining EU Member States largely unaf-
fected by the ban (i.e. Cyprus, Malta) are aggregated within the Rest of the EU
region. All remaining countries enter a residual rest of the world (ROW) region.
The 12-sector aggregation focuses on those banned commodities (Table 1) plus rel-
evant adjacent industries (upstream livestock and raw milk sectors). Remaining sec-
tors are grouped into four aggregates (cereals and oilseeds, other agriculture, other
food, and the rest of the economy).
To isolate the impacts of the ban, a careful database update is performed prior to
running the simulation experiments. A ﬁrst step takes into account the changes in the
main macro drivers between the benchmark year 2011 and 2014 (i.e. GDP, popula-
tion, factor endowments, land productivity and Croatian accession into the EU). In a
second step, changes in Russia’s trade trends with its main partners for those com-
modities of interest to the ban are implemented exogenously employing additional
data (United Nations Statistical Division, 2014). Importantly, the resulting updated
data include the aforementioned Russian bans on Canadian and US cattle meat (early
2014) and on EU pig meat due to African swine fever (February 2014) (Table S1 in
the online appendix).
To adequately accommodate the short-run supply response from a sudden ban, a
‘speciﬁc factors’ variant of the GTAP database is developed. More speciﬁcally, the
three existing mobile factors of capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour in GTAP,
are each split into a ‘sector speciﬁc’ component and a ‘mobile’ component, creating
six production factors (plus land and natural resources). We assume that 75% are tied
to the sector, whilst the remaining 25% continue to be treated as fully mobile between
sectors.10 In addition, we assume that there is zero mobility of land between diﬀerent
Table 1
Regional and commodity aggregation
Regional Aggregation (37 regions):
Russia (1)
EU Members (banned) (15): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Rest of the EU.
Other exporters (banned) (4): Canada, USA, Norway, Australia
Key Russian trading partners in commodities which are banned (16): Ukraine, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Other CIS*, Turkey, Israel, Iran, Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay,
China, North Africa, Republic of South Africa, New Zealand.
Rest of the World (1)
Commodity Aggregation (12 commodities):
Banned commodities (5): Fruits and vegetables, Fish, Cattle meat, pork and poultry meat,
dairy
Other commodities (7): Cereals and oilseeds, other agriculture, live cattle, live pigs and poultry,
raw milk, other food, other commodities.
*Other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) includes Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan.
10Other combinations (50%, 25% and 0%) of speciﬁc factors were also implemented. The
results from these data variants are available upon request from the authors.
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agricultural activities. The choice of a ‘very short run’ conﬁguration is coherent with
the availability of only 3 months of post-ban trade data (see section 4) with which to
compare the veracity of our estimates to actual post-ban market trends.
The updated 2014 benchmark reveals that the EU is a relevant exporter to Russia
in all banned products except ﬁsh; providing 29% of Russia’s fruits and vegetables,
24% of its cattle meat, 58% of its pork and poultry meat and 81% of its dairy imports
(Table 2).
Table 2 also shows that Russia is import-dependent on pork and poultry meats
from the EU, Canada and the USA, which represent more than a quarter of domestic
production. At the other extreme, cattle meat imports from the EU represent only 2%
of Russia’s domestic market. In terms of Russia’s market share of EU Member State
exports, Lithuania bears the highest burden from the ban (over 37% of produced
fruits and vegetables, almost 15% of cattle meat, 7% of pork and poultry, 8.6 of
dairy), together with Poland (over 18% of produced fruits and vegetables) and Den-
mark (13.3% of cattle meat and 8.8% of pork and poultry meat).
Table 2
Estimated share of trading partners in Russian imports of aﬀected commodities and ratio of
import over Russia’s domestic production by origin (pre-ban) (%)
Fruits and
vegetables Fish Cattle meat
Pork and
poultry meat Dairy
Imp. Prod. Imp. Prod. Imp. Prod. Imp. Prod. Imp. Prod.
EU-28 29.0 5.4 4.3 1.4 24.4 1.6 57.8 19.3 81.1 7.1
Australia 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 6.6 0.4 0.1 0.0 2.1 0.2
Canada 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 8.3 2.8 0.0 0.0
Norway 94.8 30.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
USA 2.8 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 13.4 4.5 0.2 0.0
BANNED
COUNTRIES
32.0 5.9 99.6 31.8 31.5 2.1 79.5 26.5 83.6 7.4
New Zealand 0.1 0.0 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.4
China 7.1 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0
Argentina 3.3 0.6 7.0 0.5 0.3 0.1 2.7 0.2
Brazil 0.1 0.0 33.8 2.2 17.3 5.8 0.0 0.0
Paraguay 0.0 0.0 7.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uruguay 0.1 0.0 11.4 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.1
Ecuador 6.5 1.2
Belarus 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 0.5
Kazakhstan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ukraine 1.7 0.1 1.7 0.6
Other CIS 7.8 1.4 0.0 0.0
Israel 4.4 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Iran 3.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Turkey 15.4 2.8 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0
North Africa 7.9 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
R. South Africa 2.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RoW 9.9 1.8 0.2 0.0 5.5 0.4 0.9 0.3 1.4 0.1
Source: Authors’ own calculations from GTAP database.
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2.3. Scenario design
Employing trade data from the United Nations Statistical Division (2014), Russian
import reductions on banned products from aﬀected exporting countries are exoge-
nously targeted subject to endogenous consumer utility (demand) reductions. Note
that the exogenous import reductions in Table 3 are not necessarily 100%. Firstly,
given the broad sector deﬁnitions in the GTAP database, banned products may only
account for a small share of the trade of that sector. Secondly, given the varied pattern
of trade specialisation, the list of banned commodities aﬀects some exporters more
than others. In fruits and vegetables, there is almost blanket coverage of the ban,
whilst in remaining sectors, the depth of the ban varies signiﬁcantly by exporter. Inter-
estingly, in the cattle meat sector, the EU’s most important exports for the Russian
market are trimmings, oﬀal and fats (not covered by the ban), whilst horse, sheep and
goat meat, as well as raw animal fat are also not covered by the ban.11 An important
component of pig exports to the Russian market is lard, fats and oﬀal, although under
the previous African swine fever ban, these are already removed prior to this analysis
(see section 2.2).
Table 3
Import ban shocks (% change from 2014)
Fruits and vegetables Cattle meat Pig and poultry meat Dairy
Australia 100 54.3 0.0 100
Canada 100 0.6 100 100
USA 100 6.5 100 2.3
Austria 100 5.0 5.6 100
Belgium 100 0.7 89.4 88.8
Denmark 99.6 4.8 11.7 100
Finland 100 0.0 98.9 100
France 99.5 1.1 58.6 89.5
Germany 100 2.0 18.9 96.5
Greece 100 100 100.0 86.8
Hungary 100 0.9 50.2 68.3
Ireland 0.0 11.7 85.9 55.1
Italy 100 7.3 4.8 88.2
Lithuania 100 86.9 87.7 89.7
Netherlands 100 1.6 95.5 98.0
Poland 100 32.4 51.8 98.8
Spain 100 9.8 4.6 28.9
Rest of EU 100 1.2 49.1 94.3
Norway 100 100 0.0 83.0
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
11‘Cattle meat’ in the GTAP database includes fresh or chilled meat and edible oﬀal of cattle
(bovine), sheep, goats, horses, asses, mules and hinnies; raw fats or grease from any animal or
bird. The GTAP sector ‘other meat’ includes swine and poultry meat, oﬀal, preserves and
preparations of swine and poultry meat, swine and poultry meat oﬀal or blood, ﬂours, meals
and pellets of meat or inedible meat oﬀal; greaves.
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3. Results
The complexity of the CGE model framework renders a full discussion of all the
results unwieldy. Instead, the discussion focuses on the main outcomes by sector and
region. All model results presented are changes with respect to the updated 2014
database.
3.1. Domestic eﬀects
Price and production eﬀects resulting from the ban are presented in Table 4. The
magnitude of the domestic price and output drop in the exporting countries is related
to (ceteris paribus) the share of their domestic production which is exported to Russia.
In fact, in the short term, (low factor mobility) output responses are limited, provok-
ing (in some cases, signiﬁcant) price falls.
In the fruit and vegetable sector (Table 4), Lithuania and Poland are the most
aﬀected countries with price falls of over 10% (13.3% and 11.2%, respectively),
and corresponding falls in production of 1.8% and 2.9%. However, Poland is a
Table 4
Change in market prices (P) and quantities (Q) (%)
Fruits and
vegetables Cattle meat
Pork and
poultry meat Dairy
P Q P Q P Q P Q
Austria 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3
Belgium 2.9 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.3
Denmark 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.3
Finland 1.6 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 5.7 2.2
France 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3
Germany 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2
Greece 3.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2
Hungary 1.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2
Ireland 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1
Italy 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2
Lithuania 13.3 1.8 5.5 2.2 0.6 0.2 3.2 3.3
Netherlands 1.6 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.2
Poland 11.2 2.9 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5
Spain 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2
Rest of EU 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4
EU-28* 1.9 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3
Russia 9.5 0.7 0.4 0.1 5.8 3.2 6.1 4.8
Australia 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1
Canada 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.0 0.1 0.0
Norway 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1
USA 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0
ROW 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Notes: *EU-28 prices are production weighted average.
Source: Authors’ own calculations from model results.
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large exporter, (over €150 million per year since 2010 of mainly apples), while
Lithuania’s exports of fruits and vegetables to Russia are smaller (less than
€10 million per year, principally carrots and mushrooms). In addition, Greece
(which exports mainly peaches, kiwifruit and strawberries), Belgium (pears, toma-
toes and apples), the Netherlands (pears, onions, tomatoes and peppers) and
Spain (peaches, citrus fruit, tomatoes and cucumbers) face notable market price
falls. At the EU-28 level, fruit and vegetable prices and production decrease by
1.9% and 0.3%, respectively.
Assuming perfect factor mobility for labour and capital, and focusing on the case
of Italy, Antimiani et al. (2014) report signiﬁcantly greater production response in
their aﬀected sectors. For example, they estimate Italian production falls in fruits and
vegetables of 1.1%, compared with 0.1% in our study.12 As a result, it is expected
(although not shown) that price eﬀects in their study are much more modest com-
pared to the current research. Likewise, their reported changes in Italian cattle meat
production are modest (0.4%), due to the limited shocks imposed by the ban at this
level of aggregation. Comparing with meat estimates in our study, Lithuania, which is
the main fresh bovine meat exporter to Russia, is the only Member State exhibiting
price and production changes of more than 0.3% (Table 4).
Variations are small in the pork and poultry meat sector. Historically, most EU
exports are pig meat, but since most of this trade has been removed in our update pro-
cedure owing to food safety concerns in 2014, there is little margin for further impact
in this sector. Historically, EU poultry exports to Russia are only moderate (princi-
pally from France and Germany) and consequently do not represent a large share of
the exports.
Table 4 also shows that dairy and (upstream) raw milk sectors face notable drops
in price in Finland (principally cheese, butter and milk) and Lithuania (principally
cheese). Although both EU members are relatively modest producers, they featured
within the top four dairy exporters to Russia. Due to the ban on dairy, the upstream
milk sector in most EU countries experiences a drop in price of over 1% (raw milk
results not shown) whilst short run production adjustments are minimal. At the EU
level, raw milk price and production decrease by approximately 1.5% and 0.2%,
respectively.
Examining the Russian market, prices in the fruit and vegetable and dairy sectors
rise by about 9.5% and 6.1%, respectively. Production increases but with lower mag-
nitude. In cattle meat where the ban has a lower coverage, and raw milk which is not
directly banned, increases in prices are rather small and changes in production are
even negative. This result is related to improved allocative eﬃciency of the Russian
production structure and changes in trade patterns.
As expected, those countries unaﬀected by the Russian ban witness a rise in market
prices and production, such as Belarus which increases its dairy production by 3.3%
with a price increase of 4.4% (not shown). On the other hand, the domestic price of
fruit and vegetables in Ecuador, CIS countries, Israel, North Africa and Turkey rises
between 3% and 7% without signiﬁcant increases in production (not shown).
12In Antimiani et al. (2014), complete bans are assumed across all sectors. In the case of fruits
and vegetables, this closely approximates the reality, such that the comparison presented is lar-
gely explained by the sector speciﬁcity modelling assumption.
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3.2. Trade eﬀects
The highest quantity and price impacts on Russian imports occur in ﬁsh (54%)
and dairy (56%) (Figure 1). Impacts on fruits and vegetables, cattle meat, cattle,
and pork and poultry are lower but still signiﬁcant. Russia can ﬁnd new sources of
imports for banned products, although this is more diﬃcult for ﬁsh and dairy for
which Russia’s dependency on imports from the banned countries is signiﬁcantly
higher.
Table 5 shows that the regions that beneﬁt most from the Russian import ban are
Turkey and other CIS countries (fruit and vegetable exports rise by €433 and
€165 million, respectively); Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay (summing over
these four countries, cattle meat exports rise by approximately €77 million); and
Belarus and New Zealand (dairy exports in each country increase by €202 million).
The trade pattern is broadly consistent with that reported in Antimiani et al. (2014).
Nevertheless, the meat sector in our analysis is barely aﬀected (due to the aggregation
issue discussed in section 2.3). Thus Antimiani et al. (2014) potentially overestimate
the extent to which Russia’s cattle meat imports are redirected from banned to non-
banned countries.
For remaining sectors, our study reports greater domestic price changes due to
factor immobility, resulting in larger substitution eﬀects in the Armington function
and consequently larger trade increases between Russia and non-banned countries
and between banned countries and third countries, compared to Antimiani et al.
(2014). These trade trends are conﬁrmed when examining real trade data (see
section 4).
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Figure 1. Change in Russian import quantities and prices (%)
Source: Authors’ own calculations from model results.
 2016 The Authors. Journal of Agricultural Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of Agricultural Economics Society.
10 Pierre Boulanger et al.
EU exports to other regions expand, although not suﬃciently to compensate for
the loss of the Russian market. Indeed, in the absence of any market intervention, the
expansion in EU exports of banned commodities to third countries recovers about
one-ﬁfth of the lost trade volume with Russia.13 However, when exports of non-
banned (agricultural and non-agricultural) commodities are also accounted for, the
EU recovers 81% of the banned exports to Russia by expanding trade with other
regions.14 Since the domestic prices of banned commodities decline signiﬁcantly, local
producers in aﬀected regions gain trade competitiveness through purchases of cheaper
intermediate inputs.15
Bearing in mind that the model does not capture re-exportation eﬀects, the EU re-
orientates exports toward other regions, including those not aﬀected by the ban which
divert their production away from their own domestic markets. Table 6 shows that
Table 5
Change in value of Russian imports at constant base year prices by source
Fruits and
vegetables Cattle meat
Pork and
poultry meat Dairy
Million € % Million € % Million € % Million € %
EU-28 1,429.3 100.0 67.4 12.2 112.9 47.9 1,493.7 95.1
Australia 5.7 100.0 76.7 54.3 0.0 0.0 32.5 100.0
N. Zealand 3.4 68.7 2.3 7.1 0.4 116.3 201.5 263.5
China 241.5 68.2 0.0 7.0 10.0 115.0 8.2 271.4
Canada 1.6 100.0 0.1 0.6 322.6 100.0 0.2 100.0
USA 180.4 100.0 0.1 6.5 496.7 100.0 0.1 2.3
Argentina 102.6 57.5 9.7 6.1 11.6 111.1 108.6 245.7
Brazil 4.0 68.6 44.7 5.8 708.9 97.9 1.4 268.7
Paraguay 0.0 66.8 8.7 5.3 0.7 112.2 0.0 267.1
Uruguay 3.3 66.1 14.2 5.5 0.4 113.5 38.1 243.2
Ecuador 188.4 51.4 0.0 4.8 0.1 109.6 0.1 265.0
Norway 0.1 100.0 0.1 100.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 83.0
Belarus 1.1 79.7 0.0 8.0 0.1 107.3 202.0 179.9
Kazakhstan 0.2 64.5 0.0 6.1 0.1 110.0 0.9 267.7
Ukraine 0.0 70.2 2.5 5.6 56.4 59.2 0.0 268.6
Other CIS 165.8 38.3 0.0 6.7 0.1 109.1 0.6 262.1
Israel 108.6 52.7 0.0 6.4 0.4 114.2 0.4 272.6
Iran 116.5 59.7 0.0 6.6 0.3 113.9 2.9 270.9
Turkey 433.0 56.5 0.4 5.5 8.4 110.3 9.5 268.1
North Africa 256.8 61.3 0.1 6.4 0.8 110.8 1.9 272.2
R. South
Africa
80.7 65 0.0 6.9 0.8 113.5 1 272.1
ROW 382.5 68.2 8.9 7.0 44.4 114.2 65.1 271.6
Source: Authors’ own calculations from model results.
13This statistic is calculated by dividing the row sum ‘Total’ in Table 6, with the row sum ‘EU-
28’ in Table 5.
14A full set of results for all regions and sectors is available from the authors upon request.
15The assumption of perfect competition is a key factor in this conclusion. In non-perfect mar-
kets, price changes may well be merely translated into margin changes along the food chain.
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Ukraine, North Africa, Norway, USA, Rest of the World (aggregate that includes a
vast set of countries such as China or Gulf countries), Belarus, Kazakhstan and other
CIS countries are key markets for EU export reorientation.
There are signiﬁcant increases in intra-EU fruit and vegetable trade, especially with
origin from EU members (i.e. Poland, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands and Greece) that
re-direct part of their ban aﬀected fruit and vegetable exports towards the single mar-
ket (Table 7). This increase in intra-EU fruit and vegetable trade represents 2% of
EU exports after the ban and corresponds to 41% of the loss in EU exports to Russia.
However, this does not imply signiﬁcant changes in EU consumption since the share
of fruits and vegetables trade in consumption is rather small (Table S2, in the online
appendix). Nevertheless, fruits and vegetables is the sector which exhibits the greatest
increase in internal market trade (€626.7 million, Table 7) and exhibits the largest
drops in market price (Table 4). Interestingly the increase in intra-EU trade operates
at the expense of extra-EU trade. In other words, for all banned commodities the EU
substitutes former imports with EU production. Table 7 quantiﬁes this trade diver-
sion eﬀect.
For most Member States, the percentage of banned items in cattle meat exports to
Russia is <10%. Furthermore, the decrease of exports to Russia is rather diverse for
non-EU countries facing the ban (below 1% for the USA, up to 50% for Australia).
Table 6
Change in value of EU exports to non-EU countries at constant base year prices
Fruits and
vegetables Cattle meat
Pork and
poultry meat Dairy
Million € % Million € % Million € % Million € %
Australia 1.5 7.3 0.0 0.4 2.3 1.6 5.7 4.4
N. Zealand 0.2 9.5 0.0 0.2 0.4 1.3 1.7 4.6
China 2.2 5.3 0.7 0.2 2.7 0.6 29.4 6.9
Canada 3.0 4.8 0.0 0.1 1.6 4.7 4.2 3.0
USA 12.9 5.6 0.1 0.2 10.4 3.2 31.3 4.0
Argentina 0.7 12.3 0.0 1.4 0.4 4.6 0.6 9.5
Brazil 7.5 7.0 0.0 1.3 0.5 4.2 2.9 7.5
Paraguay 0.0 10.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 4.1 0.0 8.4
Uruguay 0.1 6.9 0.0 1.4 0.1 4.7 0.1 11.1
Ecuador 0.1 11.7 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.0 0.1 6.4
Norway 11.0 3.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.9 1.6
Belarus 17.1 15.3 1.3 9.7 2.8 1.7 1.6 40.5
Kazakhstan 7.6 39.7 0.4 2.9 0.7 5.3 4.1 17.6
Ukraine 26.2 20.5 0.6 1.6 10.9 10.2 6.1 13.2
Other CIS 2.1 31.2 0.3 1.4 0.8 5.3 7.2 13.0
Israel 2.0 12.9 0.8 1.8 0.1 0.4 1.7 3.3
Iran 1.6 8.8 0.3 1.0 0.1 3.9 3.3 4.8
Turkey 8.7 14.5 1.4 0.4 0.3 2.6 1.6 4.4
North Africa 32.1 7.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 4.7 43.1 3.8
R. South Africa 0.8 6.4 0.0 0.1 2.1 2.0 2.6 3.5
ROW 97.3 6.1 0.4 0.1 16.1 0.5 210.5 4.6
Total 234.9 7.3 6.6 0.4 23.4 0.5 359.6 4.6
Source: Authors’ own calculations from model results.
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There are slight increases in EU exports of cattle meat to (inter alia) Belarus, Israel
and Turkey, but these are marginal (Table 6).
The impacts on the pork and poultry meat are modest (Table 6), since the pig sector
has already been facing export restrictions in the Russian market. However, the EU
pork and poultry meat sector is facing an indirect channel of impact. The countries
covered by the ban are signiﬁcant trade partners for the EU (13% of the EU exports
go to Australia, the USA and Ukraine). Resulting excess domestic supply and falling
market prices in those countries, has the indirect eﬀect of strengthening import trade
links between banned countries and third countries unaﬀected by the ban (e.g. CIS
countries and South Africa).
European Union exports of dairy products to all regions increase. The most promi-
nent percentage increase is observed in exports to CIS countries which face supply
deﬁciencies following the increase in demand from Russia. However, the increase in
value of EU exports at constant prices16 is higher for the USA, China and North
Africa where the EU already has a signiﬁcant volume of trade. The ban also increases
the trade of banned commodities between Member States. However, such an increase
in the trade of dairy products is modest (0.3%, Table 7) compared to the increase in
exports outside the EU (4.6%, Table 6).
Table 7
Change in value of intra-EU trade at constant base year prices by source
Fruits and
vegetables Cattle meat
Pork and
poultry meat Dairy
Million € % Million € % Million € % Million € %
Austria 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.1 1.9 0.2
Belgium 117.6 7.1 0.3 0.1 8.4 0.4 7.9 0.4
Germany 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.0 20.6 0.3
Denmark 0.4 0.3 2.2 0.6 7.9 0.3 15.1 1.2
Spain 166.3 2.2 0.4 0.1 2.1 0.1 13.2 1.8
Finland 0.2 3.4 0.1 0.5 0.7 1.2 70.1 44.8
France 5.5 0.3 0.7 0.1 9.7 0.5 38.0 0.8
Greece 52.8 9.8 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 3.5 1.2
Hungary 2.3 1.2 0.0 0.0 11.6 1.6 4.6 1.5
Ireland 0.4 0.3 1.0 0.1 1.6 0.2 12.8 0.9
Italy 10.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 3.3 0.3 18.5 1.2
Lithuania 31.6 48.3 14.2 48.3 4.1 5.1 61.2 19.5
Netherlands 86.7 2.9 0.3 0.0 6.6 0.2 46.5 1.6
Poland 180.4 46.4 8.9 1.4 7.7 0.5 13.4 1.3
Rest of EU 5.9 0.4 1.4 0.1 3.6 0.2 32.1 1.0
Total intra-EU 626.7 2.9 24.0 0.2 68.5 0.3 94.3 0.3
Extra-EU* 828.1 6.0 15.8 0.5 92.5 2.9 86.8 6.2
Notes: *The row ‘extra-EU’ quantiﬁes change in value of trade between the EU and all trade
partners outside the EU market.
Source: Authors’ own calculations from model results.
16All prices in the model are relative and are assumed to equal unity. Hence the quantities in the
model are at the same time value of that economic variable at the constant base year prices. The
term ‘value at the constant base year prices’ is used to avoid any confusion for the readers.
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The trade impacts for banned commodities consist of a reduction of exports for all
the Member States (Table 8). EU dairy exports suﬀer the most (Finland €182 mil-
lion, Poland €157, Germany €127, France €105 and Netherlands €72). The
fruit and vegetable sector is also heavily hit, Poland (€287 million) bears half of the
EU export fall, while Spain (€58), Italy (€53) and Greece (€47) face most of the
remaining decline.
3.3. Welfare eﬀects
As expected, by imposing a unilateral ban, Russia suﬀers an equivalent variation (EV)
or real income loss of €3.4 billion, which is equivalent to a 0.24% reduction in per
capita utility. In comparison, the EU-28 only witnesses an EV loss of €126 million
(0.0025% per capita utility). Other countries whose exports are aﬀected by the ban
(i.e. Australia, Canada, USA and Norway) also experience welfare losses, although
once again, in per capita terms, the impacts are negligible.17 As Russia seeks out alter-
native trade partners for those aﬀected products, the main beneﬁciaries in per capita
utility terms are Belarus, rest of CIS, Israel and Turkey. Belarus records a per capita
real income gain of 0.20%, whilst in the other three cases the magnitude is closer to
0.02–0.03%.
Russia’s EV loss is decomposed into Terms of Trade (ToT), allocative eﬃciency
(ALLOC), capital goods (CGDS) and bilateral utility (BAN) eﬀects (Figure 2). The
Table 8
Change in value of EU exports at constant base year prices by source
Fruits and
vegetables Cattle meat
Pork and
poultry meat Dairy
Million € % Million € % Million € % Million € %
Austria 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.2 1.0 0.1 13.8 1.4
Belgium 10.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.2 0.1 17.8 0.7
Germany 21.1 1.3 3.3 0.2 4.0 0.1 126.9 1.6
Denmark 1.0 0.6 1.1 0.2 3.3 0.1 32.9 1.6
Spain 57.6 0.7 3.1 0.5 2.7 0.1 12.5 1.4
Finland 3.2 29.5 0.1 0.4 4.9 4.7 182.1 33.4
France 20.3 0.7 1.6 0.1 4.9 0.2 104.6 1.6
Greece 47.3 6.0 0.3 1.3 0.2 0.3 3.9 1.2
Hungary 4.5 2.2 0.1 0.1 7.8 0.8 4.5 1.3
Ireland 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.1 6.0 0.3
Italy 52.7 1.5 4.0 0.7 1.5 0.1 55.8 2.5
Lithuania 22.8 14.8 14.7 21.2 6.0 6.3 90.6 16.6
Netherlands 22.1 0.6 1.0 0.0 8.7 0.2 71.6 1.6
Poland 287.3 27.2 4.3 0.4 1.6 0.1 156.7 10.1
Rest of EU 18.6 1.1 1.2 0.1 4.5 0.2 160.2 4.0
Total 567.8 2.1 36.9 0.3 21.0 0.1 1,039.8 2.8
Source: Authors’ own calculations from model results.
17In all the aﬀected countries, the per capita utility (real income) loss is <0.01%.
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ToT is a money metric measure of the rate of exchange between exports and imports
(current account) and savings and investment (capital account). Examining the ToT
result, the restriction on imports of certain agri-food commodities results in a short-
run rise in Russia’s import price index, leading to a (small) ToT loss of €49 million.
The ALLOC measure is the result of changing resource or product usage in the
presence of market distortions (taxes, tariﬀs and subsidies). Since a tax (subsidy) dis-
courages (encourages) resource usage compared with undistorted or Pareto eﬃcient
markets, increases in taxed (subsidised) activities yield a positive (negative) marginal
social value (Huﬀ and Hertel, 2001). The reported ALLOC loss of €899 million
reﬂects the net reduction in Russian agri-food imports (which face tariﬀs).
Finally, the bilateral utility eﬀect, which is speciﬁc to Russia, measures the money
metric equivalent of lost utility resulting from the prohibition of certain agri-food
imports. Thus, the negative EV value of €2,421 million is the result of inward shifts
in the utility function due to restrictions on import quantities.
A further decomposition of the bilateral utility EV result by banned commodities
and exporters is presented in Table 9. Approximately 48% of the total (€1,163 mil-
lion) is due to the ban on fruits and vegetables, of which €412 million, or 17%,
comes from banned fruits and vegetables from Poland. Similarly, losses of €468 mil-
lion (19%) result from banned dairy products, €460 million (19%) on banned ﬁsh
(mainly from Norway), €291 million (12%) on banned pork and poultry meats and
€38 million (1.6%) on banned cattle meat.
4. Comparison of Model Results with Observed Data
As an ex-ante tool of empirical international trade impact analysis, multiregional
CGE models still oﬀer the most complete framework. Nevertheless, to examine the
veracity and increase conﬁdence in the model estimates, where possible, a comparison
with actual trade data in the wake of the ban is necessary (Piermartini and Teh, 2005).
It should, however, be noted that such a comparison is complicated by the existence
of many non-price factors outside the scope of the model which also motivate market
trends (e.g. exchange rate changes, local climatic conditions, emergency market inter-
vention measures such as support for perishable fruits and vegetables, and promotion
of EU agricultural products, etc.). In light of this, the principal aim is to qualitatively
assess the extent to which the model correctly predicts the directional trends of trade
ﬂows and prices, whilst additional commentary on the magnitudes of the changes is
also made, where data permit.
Terms of 
trade: 
–49
Allocative: 
–899
Ban utility 
shift: 
–2,421
Figure 2. Decomposition of Russian welfare loss (million €)
Source: Authors’ own calculations from model results.
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4.1. Trade
After 7 months of embargo, EU agri-food exports to third countries increased by
2.4% between August 2014 and February 2015 compared to the previous year. In
February 2015, EU agri-food exports to third countries rose by 6.2% compared to
February 2014 (DataM, 2015a). This result is due to an increase of exports to the US
and China, together with the euro depreciation against other currencies (DG AGRI,
2015).
The model results are compared with HS6 observed trade data from COMEXT
(DataM, 2015a), which are aggregated to the GTAP sectoral and regional deﬁnitions.
To adequately cater for seasonality and the impact of the ban, we compare trade ﬁg-
ures between August 2014 (i.e. start of the ban) and November 2014 (i.e. latest avail-
able observations). Finally, since model results are mostly reported in real terms, we
look at the real change in trade volume. That is, we deﬂate the 2014 export values to
2013 prices and compare with the reported value of exports in 2013. We mainly use
agricultural price data from DG-AGRI (DataM, 2015b) and data from national sta-
tistical oﬃces of key aﬀected EU Member States (Central Statistical Oﬃce of Poland,
2015; Statistics Finland 2015; Statistics Lithuania, 2015). Our ﬁndings suggest that
the trends observed are close to actual trade observations.18
Table 9
Bilateral utility eﬀects in Russia by origin (country and commodity) (%)
Fruits and
vegetables Fish Cattle meat
Pork and
poultry meat Dairy Total
Australia 0.15 0.01 0.71 0.01 0.47 1.35
Canada 0.04 0.01 0.01 3.90 0.00 3.96
USA 4.04 0.07 0.00 6.19 0.03 10.33
Austria 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.24
Belgium 3.94 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.30 4.36
Denmark 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.16 1.07 1.44
Finland 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.07 3.57 3.79
France 1.38 0.24 0.03 0.30 1.69 3.65
Germany 0.81 0.00 0.07 0.06 2.37 3.31
Greece 3.39 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.02 3.68
Hungary 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.37 0.02 0.61
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.22
Italy 1.91 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.75 2.84
Lithuania 2.06 0.00 0.27 0.11 2.29 4.74
Netherlands 4.20 0.01 0.02 0.19 2.30 6.73
Poland 17.02 0.00 0.18 0.21 2.21 19.62
Spain 8.00 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.07 8.20
Rest of EU 0.76 0.09 0.01 0.15 1.77 2.77
Norway 0.00 18.12 0.00 0.01 0.06 18.18
Total 48.03 19.02 1.57 12.03 19.34
Source: Authors’ own calculations from model results.
18Table S3 in the online appendix presents actual data observations of intra- and extra-EU
trade changes.
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Consistent with our ﬁndings, actual trade data show that EU-28 fruit and vegetable
exports to Belarus and North Africa have increased signiﬁcantly. Exports to Canada,
Turkey, Kazakhstan and other CIS countries also increase although not as much as
foreseen by the model. The actual trade data also reveal that the EU-28 recovered
43% of its lost trade with Russia, compared with 35% reported in our model results.
Focusing on commodity aggregates, the actual data also support our ﬁnding that
intra-EU fruit and vegetable trade increases. For example, Spain, Greece and Poland
increase their exports to the EU-28 (intra-EU trade), although contrary to our simula-
tion, exports from the Netherlands, France, Germany and Hungary to the EU-28
decline. On the other hand, model results suggest an overall 2% increase in intra-EU
fruit and vegetable exports while actual data show that it declined by 1.9%, mostly
due to the fall in exports of Germany, France, Hungary and the Netherlands.
In terms of extra EU-28 cattle meat exports, observed trade data reveal that quan-
tity changes are small. The only signiﬁcant increase occurred in EU-28 exports to
China. There were slight increases in EU-28 exports of cattle meat to Belarus, Turkey,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine but these are marginal as suggested by our model results.
As simulated, impacts on the pork and poultry meat market arising from the Russian
ban were insigniﬁcant, leading to 0.3% increase in EU-28 exports.
Observed EU trade data for the dairy sector conﬁrm our model simulations (i.e.
that EU-28 exports to all regions of the world increased) except in the cases of China,
Ukraine and Brazil. The most prominent increase in percentage terms is observed in
EU-28 exports to Belarus, which is consistent with our model results, although
increases in EU exports to other CIS countries are not as high as the model simulation
suggests.
4.2. Prices
Comparison of observed prices with the model results corroborates the main ﬁndings
presented in our simulations (Table 4). We compared the model domestic price
changes reported in this paper with the actual changes in domestic prices reported in
DataM (2015b) and national statistical oﬃces of key aﬀected EU Member States.
According to our simulations, Lithuanian and Polish fruits and vegetables experi-
ence the highest domestic price fall. In both countries the actual changes for fruits and
vegetables prices is apparent and consistent with the model results (Figure S1 in the
online appendix). In Lithuania and Poland, the declines in prices are substantial while
the decrease in the EU-28 average price is relatively less. Interestingly, the EU average
price starts rising after November, eventually rising above pre-ban levels.
Observed data for the beef price in Poland and Lithuania conﬁrm that the fall is
milder compared to the fall in vegetable and fruits prices (Figure S2 in the online
appendix). On the other hand, it also veriﬁes that prices in Lithuania have fallen sig-
niﬁcantly while the price fall in Poland was relatively milder.
In the dairy markets, signiﬁcant price falls in Lithuania and Finland reported in
our results are conﬁrmed by observed price changes. The average EU-28 price also
declines as suggested by the model results. However, the magnitude of the fall in dairy
prices is greater than those predicted by the model (Figure S3 in the online appendix),
no doubt reﬂecting recent world dairy market conditions, which are not included in
our model.
Focusing on the eﬀects in Russia, according to statistics from the Russian govern-
ment, in 2014 agricultural output increased by 3.7% (USDA, 2015), which is
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consistent with our results (see Table 4). As noted above, additional non price factors
such as the weakening of the rouble against other currencies, local climatic conditions,
or state support to agricultural production and rural social development programmes
(USDA, 2015) will also have had an impact on Russian agriculture.
5. Concluding Remarks
This study quantitatively evaluates the pure market impacts of the Russian import
ban on agri-food trade, although not accounting for reactionary compensation mea-
sures undertaken by aﬀected exporters and Russia itself. In the short term, due to fac-
tor immobility, production has very little leeway to adjust, provoking notable
variations in prices, which reﬂect most of the import ban shock. As expected, the mag-
nitude of the price decrease is related to the share of national production which is
exported to Russia. The strongest price decrease occurs in the fruit and vegetable sec-
tor in Poland, Lithuania, Greece and Belgium and in the raw milk and dairy sectors in
Finland and Lithuania. In the longer term (if the ban is maintained over the years, full
results available on request), where factors of production exhibit greater mobility
between sectors, the magnitude of the price (quantity) changes is expected to be lower
(higher).
Dairy and fruits and vegetables are the sectors where the EU exports suﬀer most.
Lithuania, Finland and Poland face the largest decreases. In the short term, the EU
can recover about one-ﬁfth of the lost trade volume with Russia in banned commodi-
ties through expansion of exports in other markets. While Russia is able to substitute
imports for some banned products, alternative sources seem limited. Regions whose
exports with Russia increase include Turkey and CIS countries (fruit and vegetables,
and dairy) and South America (meat).
Results indicate that Russia is the region with the highest welfare loss (approxi-
mately €3.4 billion, equivalent to a 0.24% reduction in per capita utility). Banned
countries suﬀer a welfare loss due to the reduction in exports to Russia while in coun-
tries which substitute exports from banned countries, particularly Turkey and Brazil,
welfare increases. A comparison with observed trade data (post ban) suggests that the
model assumptions and scenario design present a plausible picture in highlighting the
most important alternative markets for EU exporters and most signiﬁcant changes in
the domestic prices of the EU member countries.
As in any modelling exercise, the usual caveats apply (i.e. assumptions, estimated
or calibrated parameters, commodity aggregation bias etc.). A key assumption relates
to the assumed split between ‘sector speciﬁc’ and ‘mobile’ factors to capture the short-
run impacts of the ban. As the results comparison in section 4 shows, this assumption
generates an improved characterisation of what happened in the wake of the ban,
although given a dearth of short-run supply elasticities compatible with the GTAP
sector/regional concordance, no attempt is made to ﬁne tune this factor split on an
activity-by-activity basis. Other splits between mobile and speciﬁc factors were simu-
lated (not shown), which reveal, as expected, that with greater factor mobility (i.e.
longer time horizons), the qualitative trends in the results remain unchanged, where
price eﬀects are reduced and quantity eﬀects are increased.19
19For interested readers, the results of diﬀering factor splits are available from the authors upon
request.
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Finally, it should be noted that our modelling strategy does not capture some criti-
cal trade elements. First, exports to the Russian market face non-tariﬀ barriers (e.g.
SPS measures) which might delay the creation of alternative sources to banned
imports.20 Second, those countries unaﬀected by the ban have to consider that deep-
ening economic relations with Russia could damage their international reputation,
which could additionally reduce Russian imports from third countries but cannot be
taken into account by an economic model. Finally, the model design impedes imports
to be re-exported, especially if entering in the Russian market through its custom
union with Belarus and Kazakhstan.
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